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1 Introduction
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the induced major systemic trans-
formation from centrally planned to market based economies, for nearly all
the Central and Eastern European countries membership within the Euro-
pean Union is one, if not the, primary goal. However, the prospects of be-
coming a member of the EU depend strongly on the economic performance
of the respective applicant country.
1
Thus, an assessment of possible timing
of EU membership of the individual countries requires an assessment of their
economic development. One primary indicator of economic development is
(the evolution of) real per capita GDP. Of course also other economic and
political criteria have to be fullled before membership can be achieved. As
all potential entrants, also the Eastern European applicant countries have
to meet legal standards and have to achieve satisfactory levels of political
developments. Criteria have been formulated at the Copenhagen summit.
In this paper we solely focus on economic growth and on relative per capita
GDP levels of the Eastern European countries relative to the European
Union, which is a very important economic criterion for the timing of po-
tential entrance in the EU. The group of countries we investigate consits of
Bulgaria (BGR), Czech Republic (CZE), Estonia (EST), Hungary (HUN),
Latvia (LVA), Lithuania (LTU), Poland (POL), Romania (ROM), Slovak Re-
public (SVK) and Slovenia (SVN). This group of countries is, as indicated
above, labeled CEEC10 throughout the paper. Compared to many other
quantitative studies on transition countries, we restrict our attention to the
smaller group of countries that have expressed their willingness to join the
EU. Several studies include up to 26 countries, where usually also the non-
Baltic republics of the former Soviet Union are included, sometimes also the
People's Republic of China and Vietnam (see e.g. deMelo et al, 1997 or Berg
et al, 1999).
For all these Eastern European countries listed above the rough picture of the
last decade is the following: The initial period of transition is characterized
by drastic falls in output, high ination and rising unemployment (see e.g.
Kornai, 1994, Fischer, Sahay and Vegh, 1998a, Berg et al., 1999 or Fischer
and Sahay, 2000). The most drastic example is a real GDP growth of about
-40 % in Latvia in 1992. For most countries in the sample, with the excep-
tion of Bulgaria and Romania, output started to grow sustainedly in 1994 or
1995. Ination rates also soared up and some countries experienced hyper-
1
At the time being there are 13 applicant countries: The ten Central and Eastern
European countries analyzed in this contribution, listed below, and additionally Cyprus,
Malta and Turkey.
1
inations.
2
Again with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, by the end
of the 1990ies ination has been brought down to one-digit or low two-digit
numbers. Thus, among these countries stabilization policy has been, grosso
modo, successful and growth is now experienced widely.
Economic growth in these countries depends on two sets of factors, see e.g.
Fischer et al. (1998b): On factors in relation to transition, which again can
be separated in initial conditions and reform policy, on the one hand, and
on the determinants of long-run growth as described by neoclassical growth
theory on the other hand. DeMelo et al. (1997) nd that initial conditions
do matter, but that the adverse eect of unfavorable initial conditions can
be overcome by strict commitment to reform policy.
The further along a country is on its transition process, the more important
will the standard neoclassical determinants of economic growth become. If
the growth process is described adequately by the neoclassical determinants
of growth (along the lines of Ramsey, 1928, Solow, 1956 or Cass, 1965),
then some clear predictions concerning the long-run co-movement of macro-
economic aggregates follow, like e.g. a positive correlation between the invest-
ment share and output growth. An assessment of possible ways to project
the future evolution of GDP growth in this countries requires rst an un-
derstanding of the experience so far. In section 2 we therefore investigate
the relationships between some macro-economic variables like GDP, invest-
ment and government consumption, which gure (of course) prominently
in the growth literature. The possible emergence of the standard correla-
tions between these variables, like e.g. the already above mentioned positive
correlation between the investment share and growth, or a negative correla-
tion between initial GDP and subsequent growth, will indicate whether the
standard neoclassical growth model can directly be applied to assess growth
prospects.
3
It turns out, not too unexpected, that especially during the rst
part of the transition period these standard correlations cannot be observed.
I.e. during this period, the systemic collapse puts these countries too far o
from a (balanced) neoclassical growth path, as to observe standard behavior.
During the later years of the sample, some emergence of expected relation-
ships, for instance a positive correlation between the investment share and
growth, can be observed. For both cases, whether the sample is split after
1993 or for the full sample, surprisingly always a positive correlation between
initial GDP and the average GDP growth rate is observed. Thus, up to 1998,
2
The detailed numbers are given in table 1 in section 2.
3
This negative correlation between initial GDP and average growth is usually labeled
unconditional -convergence in the growth literature. If it applies, one observes a tendency
of narrowing income dierences between the countries. For a more detailed discussion see
the following sections.
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there is no tendency for convergence within this group.
To gain further understanding about the evolution of the incomes
4
of the
CEEC10 since the beginning of transition we also apply simple methods of
distribution dynamics.
5
The positive correlation between GDP in 1993 and
the average growth rate since then indicates that countries in a favorable
position in 1993 have been able to take advantage of this. This may be the
case because of early reform that puts the respective countries in a favorable
situation or it could also be due to a longer lasting eect of positive initial
conditions.
An implication of the above observation is that growth projections cannot
be based directly on estimated growth equations for the CEEC10 group, as
applying these equations would imply to project divergent behavior between
the countries.
6
This however, is not the most likely scenario to occur: Given
that all these countries are preparing themselves for EU membership, similar
experiences with previous enlargements lead us to conclude that it is very
likely to observe a narrowing of income gaps, both between these countries
and with respect to the European Union. Ben-David (1996) shows that al-
ready the prospect of EU membership has a positive eect on the potential
entrants' economic performance. Given the current experience of the macro-
economic evolution in the CEEC10, an alternative approach to base growth
projections upon has to be found. The approach followed in this paper, is
to generate growth projections for the CEEC10 on the historically observed
growth process in the current EU member states since 1960. This means
that in a rst step, growth or convergence equations are estimated for the
European Union. These equations are then used to compute implied growth
rates for the Central and Eastern European countries by inserting values of
the variables as observed in the CEEC countries or as specied in scenarios
to be described later.
Section 3 therefore starts with an investigation of the growth and convergence
behavior observed in the European Union. A variety of specications of con-
vergence equations is estimated for the EU14 countries (by which we denote
the EU15 excluding Luxemburg), which then serve as the basis for project-
ing the income prospects of the CEEC10. This approach has initially been
4
The term income is used as sloppy notation for real per capita GDP.
5
We follow the line of argument developed by Quah in a series of papers to assess the
distribution dynamics, i.e. the evolution of the joint distribution of GDPs over time. Due
to the small amount of observations we are conned to estimate transition probabilities of
discrete state Markov chains, see section 2.
6
An extensive summary of empirical, regression based growth literature is contained in
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and in Barro (1997). A methodologically broader summary
is given in Durlauf and Quah (1998).
3
applied by Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1998b). Compared to Fischer, Sahay
and Vegh (1998b) our paper rests on a more sophisticated econometric inves-
tigation, with a variety of equations estimated by panel methods (compared
to pure cross-section regressions in Fischer et al., 1998a). The variety of
specications allows us to assess the robustness of the results. Note that the
equations are estimated for the EU only, not for a larger sample of countries,
and growth projections are only based on this approach for countries that
are applying for EU membership. We believe that for the group of countries
investigated, this approach constitutes a feasible computational exercise, as
already the last decade has witnessed a substantial amount of economic and
systemic convergence of the Eastern European transition countries to the
EU. Reforms in the CEEC10 are undertaken with reference to the institu-
tional arrangements within the EU. The EU is the main foreign investor and
trading partner of these countries. These strengthened linkages imply loosely
speaking convergence in the economic structure of the countries involved.
Based on the array of growth projections, derived from the dierent equa-
tions and scenarios (see section 3), the numbers of years it takes the countries
of the CEEC10 group to reach a certain level of average EU income are com-
puted.
7
Computing convergence times is of course more illustrative than
just presenting growth rate projections. All convergence time computations
are based on an assumed real per capita GDP growth in the EU15 of 2 %
per year. It turns out that, with the exceptions of Slovenia and the Czech
Republic, most of the countries still have more than 20 or 30 years to go,
depending on the scenario assumed, until they reach the specied relative
levels of average European Union real per capita GDP.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In section 2 the experience in the
CEEC10 between 1989 and 1998 is summarized and some investigations into
the distribution of per capita GDPs are presented. In section 3 the equations
estimated for the EU are presented and discussed.
8
In this section also the
scenarios and the results based on these scenarios are reported. In section 4
some conclusions are drawn. In the appendix some additional gures and
tables related to section 3 are collected.
7
An example is 70 % of the EU25 average real per capita GDP, where with EU25 we
denote all 15 current EU member states and the CEEC10 investigated together. This is
an interesting relative level, as this is the percentage that Portugal and Spain had, relative
to the EU12, when they entered the EU consisting of 10 countries before in 1986.
8
In a separate appendix, available from the authors upon request, some investigations
concerning the dynamics of the distribution of incomes in the EU15 and for all 25 countries
together are collected.
4
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
BGR 26.2 238.5 59.6 51.1 72.8 62.7 121.0 949.0 22.2
CZE 9.2 46.2 16.8 17.9 10.9 9.8 9.6 6.5 11.0
EST   304.0 954.0 36.0 42.0 29.0 14.6 12.5 4.4
HUN 25.7 25.4 21.6 21.3 19.5 25.5 21.2 18.5 13.4
LTU   383.0 1163.0 189.0 45.1 35.7 13.1 8.4 2.4
LVA   262.0 959.0 35.0 26.3 23.1 13.1 7.0 2.8
POL 480.1 55.3 38.5 30.5 28.4 27.9 18.7 14.0 12.0
ROM 13.6 195.0 200.1 227.4 138.9 35.2 45.3 147.0 45.9
SVK 6.6 34.6 11.2 15.4 13.8 9.7 4.5 6.6 5.1
SVN 490.8 94.9 208.2 37.1 22.6 15.2 11.1 8.8 7.3
Table 1: Annual ination rate in the CEEC10. Source: WIIW, OECD.
2 The Structural Shock of Transition
In gures 1 and 2 the growth rates of real per capita GDP are displayed for
the CEEC10 for all years where data for the respective country are available.
9
These gures forcefully show the dramatic impact of the breakdown of com-
munism and central planning. The most dramatic picture is, as mentioned
already in the introduction, the one for Latvia, with the dramatic fall of real
per capita GDP by about 40 % from 1991 to 1992. Concerning the two reform
laggards, Romania and Bulgaria, one sees that the limited amount of eco-
nomic reform in these countries has not been suÆcient to achieve sustained
growth. On the contrary the Baltic republics, severely hit by the disintegra-
tion of the Soviet Union, have been able to achieve sustained growth since the
mid 1990ies. Thus, these pictures conrm the well known fact that the tran-
sition phase can be split in an early phase of contraction and a subsequent
phase of stabilization and eventual growth.
In the early phase of transition ination rates soared up, see table 1.
Since the mid 1990ies ination has been under control, with the exception of
Bulgaria and Romania. Many countries have achieved single-digit ination
rates in the mean time.
For an assessment of the growth prospects of the CEEC10 it is interesting
to analyze the growth experience up to now. As pointed out e.g. by Fischer,
Sahay and Vegh (1998a, 1998b) growth in transition depends on two sets of
factors. The rst set consists of the eects of the transition process itself.
This includes initial conditions and reform policy. Consensus in the litera-
9
The longest series are available for the Czech Republic and Romania back to 1961.
All series used in this paper end in 1998.
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Figure 1: Growth rates of real per capita GDP for BGR, CZE, EST, HUN,
LVA and LTU; for all years when data are available. Source: World Bank,
own calculations.
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Figure 2: Continuation: Growth rates of real per capita GDP for POL, ROM,
SVK and SVN; for all years when data are available. Source: World Bank,
own calculations.
7
ture is that initial conditions do have a signicant eect at the beginning of
transition, but that their importance is declining rapidly (see e.g. deMelo et
al., 1997, Havrylyshyn, Ivorski and van Rooden, 1998 or Berg et al., 1999).
Especially it is found that countries with adverse initial conditions can never-
theless achieve a positive outcome by strong commitment to - and therefore
a large extent of - reform. The second set of factors relevant for growth
prospects of transition economies are the standard forces driving long-run
economic growth as described by the (one-sector) neoclassical growth model
dating back to Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956) and Cass (1965). The further
time proceeds, the more relevant will the neoclassical growth determinants
be. Thus, unless a great backlash is observed in these countries, medium run
growth projections may be based around the neoclassical growth framework
(with possibly allowing for transitional eects).
Empirical research on economic growth has witnessed an enormous amount
of interest during the last 10 to 15 years. One of the reasons for this renewed
interest is the general current interest of the profession on growth theory,
another reason is the formulation and empirical investigation of dierent
notions of convergence within this framework. In essence, the neoclassical
growth model in its standard formulation implies that all economies charac-
terized by the same underlying parameters (concerning e.g. the production
function) end up in the same steady state, regardless of the initial position.
It furthermore implies a negative correlation between initial GDP and the
average growth rate. This phenomenon is usually labeled as -convergence,
it has initially been dened in Sala-i-Martin (1990) and has been popularized
by a series of papers by Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992a,
1992b).
10
For economies described by dierent parameters, the steady state
values may dier. This leads to the concept of conditional -convergence,
where a negative cross-section correlation between GDP growth and initial
GDP is observed after controlling for cross country dierences in parameters.
Thus, convergence implies, conditional or unconditional, a tendency for nar-
rowing income gaps within a group of countries.
In gures 3 and 4 the (unconditional) correlation between the average growth
rate of real per capita GDP and (the log of) initial real per capita GDP, the
average share of investment of GDP and the average share of public consump-
tion of GDP are shown. In gure 3 this is done for the whole period 1989
to 1998 and in gure 4 the correlations are displayed over the sub-periods
1989 to 1993 and 1994 to 1998.
11
Growth theory predicts a positive corre-
10
Already Baumol (1986) and DeLong (1988) investigate long-run convergence between
incomes of dierent countries.
11
The timing convention in this paper is the following: The initial year is always the
year prior to the period over which averages are computed, e.g. for the period 1994 to
8
lation between investment and growth, and a negative correlation between
government consumption and growth:
12
Looking at the full sample period
we see a small positive correlation between initial GDP in 1989 and the av-
erage growth rate. This indicates that a favorable position at the beginning
of transition may have contributed to an easier and faster implementation
of reforms which then helped to achieve growth. Looking at the correspond-
ing pictures for the sub-periods one sees no correlation between growth and
initial GDP in the rst sub-period and a positive correlation in the second
sub-period.
13
Thus initial conditions, if summarized by per capita GDP, are
not the main or sole determinant of the performance, not even during the
rst period of transition.
14
The pictures conrm the well known fact of a
very dierential impact of the start of transition from a centrally planned to
a market oriented economy on the individual countries.
Let us analyze the relationship between the investment share and growth
next. For the full sample a very small positive correlation is observed, when
the two sub-periods are distinguished, a negative correlation is observed in
the rst period and a positive correlation in the second period. The negative
correlation in the rst sub-period reects the eects of the huge institutional
change and the disorganization of the existing economic structure.
15
It is
probably this picture that most clearly shows the dramatic consequences of
the transition process.
Concerning government consumption, in both periods a positive correlation
with GDP growth is observed. This again stands in contrast to observations
made for groups of developed industrial nations.
16
Thus, during transition a
stabilizing inuence of government consumption is observed. For an analysis
of the eects of public spending on GDP growth the composition of public
spending has to be taken into account, this is however beyond the scope of
this paper.
Figures 3 and 4 show that it is useful and important to separate the
transition period in an early and a later stage, if one wants to analyze the
1998 this is 1993. This timing is due to the computation of growth rates from levels data.
12
The negative correlation between government consumption and growth is often re-
ferred to as Wagner's law. The empirical evidence is mixed. Ram (1987) and Levine and
Renelt (1992) nd opposite results.
13
Removing Bulgaria from the sample makes the positive correlation even more pro-
nounced.
14
In the left upper graph of gure 4 only the Baltic countries are below the regression
line. Removing them from the sample does not qualitatively change the picture.
15
See e.g. Blanchard and Kremer (1997). Even when the Baltic countries are removed
from the sample the negative correlation persists.
16
In the appendix the corresponding gures are displayed for the current EU member
countries.
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Figure 3: This graph shows in clockwise order the correlation between the
average growth rate of real per capita GDP and log real per capita GDP in
the initial year, the average investment share of GDP and the average share
of public consumption of GDP. The averages are computed over the period
1990 to 1998.
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Figure 4: The left column corresponds to the period 1990 to 1993, the right
column corresponds to the period 1994 to 1998: The rst row displays the
correlation between the average growth rate of real per capita GDP and
initial real per capita GDP (1989 and 1993), the average investment share of
GDP (2nd row) and the average share of public consumption of GDP (3rd
row).
11
economic situation in these countries. Taking the evidence together it be-
comes clear that medium- or long-run growth projections cannot be directly
based on growth equations estimated for the CEEC10 with the transition pe-
riod 1989 to 1998 as the sample. Applying these would imply the projection
of the non-standard transitional behavior observed up to now into the future,
which will in its growth behavior be more and more adequately described by
standard neoclassical economic mechanisms and relationships.
Before going to assess the possible future evolution of real per capita GDP in
the CEEC10, it is interesting to try to gain further insights into the observed
dynamics of income in these countries. A close relative of -convergence is
-convergence: -convergence is occurring when the cross-sectional standard
deviation of incomes is decreasing.
17
In gure 5 the cross-sectional income
distribution is displayed for increasing sub-samples of Central and Eastern
European countries. Up to 1965 income data are only available for the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Romania. In 1966 Latvia is added to the sample, etc..
The picture clearly reveals that signicant progress has been made in nar-
rowing the income gaps between these countries up to 1989. Narrowing the
income gaps, both within and between countries, has been an explicit goal
of socialist economic policy in the Council of Mutual Economic Assitance
(CMEA) member countries (see e.g. Estrin and Urga, 1997).
18
The gure
shows that this goal has indeed been achieved to a signicant extent.
19
Since
1989 the cross-sectional dispersion has increased substantially, reecting the
dierential impact of transition on the CEEC10 up to now. For comparison
the extent of -convergence in the CEEC10 countries (with growing sam-
ple), the European Union (i.e. the 15 current member countries excluding
Luxemburg) and for both groups of countries together is displayed in g-
ure 6. Figure 6 also clearly indicates the occurrence of -convergence within
the current European Union member states, with the exception of the mid
1980ies.
Taking all countries together the full dimension of the transitional shock
17
It is well known that -convergence is a necessary although not suÆcient condition for
-convergence. Therefore in the period 1989 to 1998 -convergence cannot have occurred
in the CEEC10, since we have already found no evidence for -convergence.
18
Slovenia, being part of Yugoslavia then, has only been a partial member of the CMEA.
Yugoslavia joined the CMEA as a partial member in 1964. Also the Baltic republics have
achieved their independence only after the dissolution of the CMEA in 1991. Applying
time series based notions of convergence (as Estrin and Urga), which are proposed by
Bernard and Durlauf (1995, 1996) one nds for our data set evidence for convergence
between Hungary and the Czech Republic. Due to the fact that suÆciently long time
series are only available for some countries, these methods, which resort to unit root and
cointegration analysis, can only be applied to a very limited extent.
19
We however refrain from a causal interpretation of this result here.
12
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Figure 5: Cross sectional dispersion of log real per capita GDP in the
CEEC10. The dierent lines are drawn for maximum samples of countries
with available income data, i.e. SIGMA E60 is for CZE, HUN and ROM,
and SIGMA E65 is for these three countries plus LVA, and so on.
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Figure 6: Cross sectional dispersion of log real per capita GDP for the
CEEC10, EU15 and all countries together, which in slight abuse of notation
are labeled Europe. The dispersion is computed using the maximum avail-
able number of observations for Central and Eastern European countries in
each period.
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becomes very evident: Europe
20
wide convergence up to the end of the
1980ies. Then the early transition period leads to a signicant increase of
Europe-wide income dispersion, which is approximately constant since about
1994.
Let us next analyze the dynamics of the income distribution of the CEEC10
in more detail. Quah (1996a, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c) has forcefully
advocated the use of distribution dynamics methods for the analysis of the
evolution of e.g. incomes over time. This approach tries to model the evolu-
tion of the joint distribution (over all countries) of the variables investigated.
The underlying idea is to formulate statistical models to describe the evo-
lution of the joint distribution of the variable of interest. By doing so, it
becomes possible to study mobility and persistence in the distribution and
to compute a possibly existing ergodic distribution.
21
Distribution dynamics
methods are in a way complementary to the concepts - and -convergence:
-convergence may be observed due to the convergence of the distribution
of incomes to a uni- or multi-modal limiting distribution, where these two
possibilities lead to very dierent conclusions, but cannot be distinguished by
just looking at the second moments. Compared to the regression based con-
cepts of convergence, which focus on the mean behavior like -convergence
or on the second moment of the cross-section (-convergence), the analysis
of the distribution allows by construction to obtain a more complete picture.
As a notion of convergence, based on the evolution of the joint distribution,
one might think of e.g. convergence of the joint distribution towards a de-
generated ergodic distribution.
A simple graphical device to investigate mobility within the income distribu-
tion over time is given by so called cross prole plots (Dolado et al., 1992): For
a selection of years t
1
; : : : ; t
p
, the incomes in the rst year (y
1;t
1
; : : : ; y
n;t
1
) are
reordered according to increasing magnitude (y
l
1
;t
1
; : : : ; y
l
n
;t
1
), this induces an
ordering l = (l
1
; : : : ; l
n
). Then the incomes in the years t
2
; : : : ; t
p
are also re-
ordered along this ordering l. By construction, the rst plot is monotonously
non-decreasing, the more variability is in the later plots the more dynamics
is present in the income distribution.
22
20
In abuse of the word Europe, we will refer to Europe as the following countries, the
current EU member states and the 10 CEEC countries investigated.
21
The ergodic distribution, the long-run steady state distribution, then e.g. allows to
assess whether there is a tendency for convergence clubs (Baumol, 1986) when it is bi-
or multimodal. When the ergodic distribution has been attained, mobility within this
distribution is still possible.
22
If the plots remain monotonous over the years, this means that no country has over-
taken another country. Numerical measures in combination to the graphical evidence
present in cross prole plots have e.g. been presented by Quah (1997b): For any given point
of time, serCorr is the rst order correlation coeÆcient of the dierences of incomes, given
14
Figure 7: Cross Prole Plots of relative log real per capita GDP for the
CEEC10 for the years 1989, 1993, 1995 and 1998. Clockwise ordering starting
in the upper left corner.
In Figure 7 a sequence of cross prole plots is displayed for the CEEC10
for the years 1989, 1993, 1995 and 1998. The variable plotted in this gure is
given by the log of relative real per capita GDP, i.e. the GDP values are nor-
malized by the mean. By transforming incomes to quantities relative to the
mean, the eects of (trend) income growth on the distribution are ltered.
Only two changes in the ordering are observed, which both already occur in
the early transition period. Lithuania falls back to the second lowest level,
starting at the fourth lowest value and Estonia falls back from the fourth
richest position. These changes are once again reecting the dramatic im-
pact of the break-up of the Soviet Union on the Baltic republics.
23
Thus, up
the ordering l. If we denote by E

y the empirical mean of the income dierences 

y
l
=
y
l
  y
l 1
, then serCorr = (
P
l
(

y
l
  E

y)
2
)
 1
(
P
l
(

y
l
  E

y)(

y
l 1
  E

y)) A
variance type measure is given by Vartn =
1
N 2
P
l
(

y
l
 

y
l 1
)
2
, where N denotes the
number countries analyzed. As serCorr is a correlation coeÆcient, it is always bounded by
-1 and +1. Note that it is 0 for a straight line. serCorr is generally getting more negative
with increasing variation in the cross prole plot. Vartn measures the variation around
the squared mean, is non-negative and increases with increasing variation in the plot. As
both measures are normalized by sample size, they can be compared across samples (e.g.
country groups) with dierent sizes.
23
The quantitative measures serCorr and Vartn associated with the graphs in gure 7
are displayed in the appendix. For comparison, these measures are computed also for the
15
to 1998, the initial GDP in 1989 remains by and large the factor determining
the relative position of a country in a ranking of CEEC10 per capita real
GDP.
24
This observation, together with the previously made observation of
a positive correlation between growth and initial GDP, leads directly back to
the conclusion that in the CEEC10 no form of convergence, however dened,
is observed up to and including 1998.
Although cross prole plots deliver interesting descriptive insights into the
evolution of the income distribution, they cannot be used to assess the likely
future evolution of the joint income distribution. For that purpose one has
to resort to statistically founded methods, as indicated above. The basic un-
derlying idea of the distribution dynamics approach is to model the evolution
of the joint distribution as governed by a functional. Thus the idea is that
the evolution from e.g. t to t + 1 is for all t described by a functional, say
T . For a given initial income distribution F
0
, the income distribution in time
t is given by F
t
= T
t
(F
0
). If for t ! 1 a limiting distribution F
1
exists,
then this is called the ergodic distribution. Several possibilities for classes of
functionals T are possible, the only requirement is that it transforms distri-
butions to distributions.
Due to the small amount of available observations we consider in this paper
for T only transition probability matrices of discrete state Markov chains, i.e.
we think of the evolution of the distribution according to a Markov chain.
25
When modeling Markov chains, it is convenient to transform the observations
to stationary quantities. This is achieved in this paper, as already before,
by normalizing incomes in each period by the average income. Besides the
choice of states or classes, also the transition horizon has to be selected (e.g.
transition from t to t+ 1 or to t+ 5). Both, the number of classes as well as
the partition of the distribution to generate the classes, have to be specied.
The transition period is chosen to be one year, the number of classes is four
and concerning the class boundaries the following choices are investigated.
26
In the rst choice the classes are constructed in the following way: The rst
class ranges from 0 to
1
4
, the second class from
1
4
to
1
2
, the third from
1
2
to
3
4
and the fourth class corresponds to values larger than
3
4
.
27
The second
EU15 countries and for the group of all 25 countries together.
24
Due to relatively large dierences between the countries and the short period analyzed,
overtaking requires extreme events to occur, as has been the case in the Baltic countries.
25
If more observations become available, stochastic kernels can be estimated as transition
functionals. These are, basically, the continuous state analogue to discrete state Markov
chains.
26
Note that the results depend on the transition horizon, the number of classes and also
on the way the classes are constructed.
27
Remember that incomes are normalized by the average.
16
Obs.
15 0.929 0.071 0.000 0.000
23 0.050 0.800 0.150 0.000
52 0.000 0.064 0.934 0.000
309 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Ergodic 0.205 0.393 0.248 0.154
Table 2: Transition matrix for relative log real per capita GDP for the
CEEC10. The transition period is 1 year and classes are constructed per
year with boundaries 1/4, 1/2 and 3/4.
Obs./Upper limit 0.978 1.008 1.020 1.117
25 0.909 0.091 0.000 0.000
25 0.130 0.739 0.130 0.000
25 0.000 0.125 0.667 0.208
25 0.000 0.000 0.143 0.857
Ergodic 0.287 0.200 0.209 0.304
Table 3: Transition matrix for relative log real per capita GDP for the
CEEC10. The transition period is 1 year and classes are constructed to
achieve a uniform initial distribution.
possibility employed is to choose classes in order to achieve a uniform initial
distribution over the classes. The results for these choices are presented in
tables 2 and 3. In these tables also the implied ergodic distribution is shown
in the nal row.
The two sets of results give a quite similar picture: (i) a high degree of
persistence, i.e. a high probability of staying in the same class
28
and (ii) a
very broad limiting distribution, which is perhaps bi-modal (see especially
the ergodic distribution displayed in table 3). This can be interpreted as
follows: If the observed behaviour, with a lot of variation in the performance
of the individual Central and Eastern European countries is to continue, a
separation of the countries in two groups is going to emerge: The successful
reformers on the one hand and the laggards that fail to achieve suÆcient
sustained growth to keep up on the other hand.
28
This is given by the large diagonal values in the transition matrices.
17
3 An Indirect Approach to Assess Conver-
gence Prospects
In the previous section it has been demonstrated that among the CEEC10,
a pattern of very heterogeneous per capita GDP development has been ob-
served in the last decade. The structural transformation process has the
eect that the growth process in these countries is up to now not governed
primarily by the neoclassical determinants of long-run growth. As time pro-
ceeds, the growth process will, unless great repercussions are experienced,
more and more be shaped by these determinants.
The process of transition manifests itself e.g. in the non-validity of standard
relationships between key macro-economic variables, as has been shown in
the detailed discussion in section 2. Up to now only tendencies for the es-
tablishment of the standard relationships (or correlations) can be observed.
This implies that growth projections for the CEEC10 based on equations
estimated for these countries over the period since 1989, necessarily projects
growth scenarios reecting the disequilibrium situation observed so far. Thus,
this approach implies growth scenarios that not so much reect the prospects
that may materialize after a successful transition, but that project the cur-
rent turbulent developments into the future.
Therefore an alternative indirect approach is required. Given that the eco-
nomic size of these countries compared to the EU is small and that the
destination of these countries is full membership in the EU, we may expect a
systemic and economic convergence of these countries towards the European
Union. Systemic convergence means e.g. that the applicant countries have to
accept the legal system of the EU, as specied in the acquis communautaire
or that their markets for goods and factors have to be organized in a way
that is compatible with EU practice. Furthermore, it has to be noted that
the markets of the CEEC10 will have to be opened within the single market
of the EU after accession and a possible transition phase. Also economic
policy will have to be conducted in ways more and more similar to the way
economic policy is organized and carried out in the EU member countries.
29
Concerning direct economic integration measures, e.g. the fact that about
70 % of the CEEC10's exports are directed to the European Union and the
fact that the European Union is the main source of FDI in Eastern Europe
deserve mentioning. All in all, loosely speaking, the applicant countries can
29
In a latter stage, when proceeding further to become also members of the European
Monetary Union, the CEEC10 will have to fulll the Maastricht criteria as well. This
implies relatively clear quantitative boundaries for the conduct of scal and monetary
policy.
18
be expected to become economically more and more similar to the EU, which
enforces possible convergence of the CEEC10 to the EU in its present bound-
aries.
Ben-David (1993) argues forcefully that already the prospect of EU member-
ship may contribute to convergence. More precisely he analyzes the extent
and timing of -convergence among the founding countries of the European
Community and the reduction of trade barriers and taris between the coun-
tries. He nds a close correspondence between measures that decrease bar-
riers to trade and reductions in the standard deviation of log per capita
incomes.
Our quantitative assessment concerning income prospects of the CEEC10 is
based on growth equations estimated for the European Union countries, ex-
cluding Luxemburg.
30
This approach, previously applied by Fischer, Sahay
and Vegh (1998b), basically amounts to a mapping of the stable structural
relationships prevalent in the EU on the CEEC10 countries. Once again, an
implicit assumption for the validity of this approach is the continuation of
the reform process in the Eastern European applicant countries. This in-
cludes also the ongoing development and deepening of market institutions
and transparency.
To a certain extent, this approach internalizes the possible positive eects of
integration with and eventually membership in the European Union. As the
equations are estimated for the period 1960 to 1998, they catch the general
growth and convergence picture within Western Europe. Only since 1995
all 14 countries in the sample are members of the European Union.
31
Given
this, we see the equations as predicting moderately optimistic scenarios for
the CEEC10, which may serve as baselines for more optimistic scenarios that
take into account further eects of (prospective) membership. Later on in
this section, this comparison will be made by computing accelerated growth
scenarios, which are intended to capture additional benecial eects of EU
membership. The implied results of these faster growth scenarios are then
compared to the results of the baseline scenarios.
The EU14 countries, for which the equations are estimated show a substan-
30
Luxemburg is excluded from the regressions, because of its level of economic develop-
ment and economic structure it is an outlier within the EU. Certainly it is the country
which is the furthest away from the CEEC10, e.g. in terms of per capita GDP. The cur-
rent European Union member states without Luxemburg are referred to as EU14 in the
following.
31
The European Union started in 1957 with 6 member states, the BENELUX countries,
France, Germany and Italy. In 1973 Denmark, Great Britain and Ireland became members.
In the 1980ies the EU was enlarged in the mediterranean area, with Greece joining in 1981
and Portugal and Spain in 1986. Finally the latest enlargement has taken place in 1995
with Austria, Finland and Sweden joining the European Union.
19
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Figure 8: The sub-period correlations between the average growth rate of
real per capita GDP and log real per capita GDP in the initial years (1960,
1969, 1979 and 1989) for the EU14. The averages are computed over the sub-
periods 1961 1969, 1970 1979, 1980 1989 and 1990 1998. The regression
lines indicate the unconditional  coeÆcients observed in the sub-periods:
2.506, 2.248, 0.831 and 3.593 %.
tial degree of unconditional -convergence since 1960. In gure 8 the extent
of unconditional -convergence is displayed for the sub-periods 1961 1969,
1970 1979, 1980 1989 and 1990 1998. In all 4 periods convergence pre-
vails (with 2.506, 2.248, 0.831 and 3.593%). It is interesting to note that
convergence was slowest in the 1980ies and fastest in the 1990ies. The aver-
age convergence speed over the total period is 2.046%.
32
Convergence with a
speed of about 2% is a widely documented phenomenon occurring in dierent
sets of regions or countries. Barro (1991) nds convergence in a large cross-
section of countries, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992b) analyze convergence
across the US and across Japanese prefectures and Sala-i-Martin (1996) and
32
The corresponding gure 10 can be found in the appendix.
20
Quah (1996a) analyze European regions.
In the appendix also the correlations between real per capita GDP growth
and the investment share of GDP and between real per capita GDP growth
and the share of government consumption of GDP are shown. This is done in
gure 10 for the total period and in gures 11 and 12 for the 4 sub-periods.
Signicant correlations of the expected signs are observed throughout.
The equations, presented in table 4, are estimated pooled over the 4 previ-
ously mentioned sub-periods.
33
Therefore, the dependent variable is the av-
erage annual growth of real per capita GDP, with the averages taken over
periods of about 10 years length.
34
With this choice of variables, the depen-
dent variable (GDP), is the variable of interest, the average annual growth
rate of real per capita GDP. The set of independent variables consists of the
logarithm of real per capita GDP in the initial year (GDP
0
),
35
the share of
public consumption of GDP (GC), the share of (private and public) gross
investment of GDP (DI), primary school education (PRIM), the share of to-
tal trade (i.e. exports plus imports) of GDP (TT), the annual population
growth rate (POPG), a dummy for the rst decade (DUM1) and a dummy
for Ireland (DUMIRL).
In table 4 several equations are reported. Berg et al. (1999) point out that
the choice of economic theory compatible specications is important, because
purely statistically based approaches may lead to very versatile and implau-
sible conclusions. The specication of several equations also allows us to
assess the robustness of the results in a straightforward way. The pooled es-
timation is performed on 56 observations and the estimation method is SUR,
where cross-sectional correlation as well as heteroskedasticity are allowed for.
33
The data are taken from the Worldbank data base and have been extended by own
calculations. The Worldbank data can be downloaded at www.worldbank.org.
34
Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1998b) only use a cross-section regression. This implies a
loss of information due to long-run averaging over about 30 years. 10 years may be a
sensible lower bound for long-run growth analysis. If higher frequencies are used, business
cycle phenomena may be present in the data.
35
For the average growth rate over 1961 1969 the initial GDP is GDP in 1960, as
already explained before.
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The values in the initial years of the sub-periods have been employed
for all independent variables in equations (1in) and (2in). In the empiri-
cal growth literature both variants, with initial values and average values of
the independent variables, are commonly used. Initial values may help to
overcome possible endogeneity problems, which may be present when using
period averages (especially with respect to investment variables). In our case
it turns out that both variants lead to very similar results. All equations lead
to coeÆcients that are well interpretable, both with respect to their signs and
their magnitudes. Also, when specifying the equations, attention has been
paid to restrict ourselves to equations that contain only variables that have
been seen to be robust in the growth literature (see e.g. Sala-i-Martin, 1997)
and on which scenarios can be based reasonably.
The estimated equations are used to compute growth scenarios for the CEEC10
as follows: Average annual growth rates are computed for the Central and
Eastern European countries by assigning specic values to the variables in-
vestment share (DI) and government consumption (GC). For the other inde-
pendent variables the actual values are inserted for each of the countries. In
the equations where the values in the initial period are chosen for the inde-
pendent variables in the estimation, i.e. for equations (1in) and (2in), the
1990 values are inserted. In the other equations the actual values are com-
puted as averages over the period 1990 to 1998. The eects of the dummy
variables are not included in the growth projections.
The variables investment share and government consumption, on which the
scenarios are based, are two of the most important variables for growth.
They are directly inuenced by policy choices and developments.
36
Another
variable important for growth and development is trade, see e.g. Ben-David
(1996). Total trade depends on the openness of the countries vis-a-vis e.g.
the European Union, which is going to increase in the next decade. How-
ever, trade (especially) with the European Union is already at very high
levels. Thus, no spectacular increases are to be expected. Using the average
values for TT over the period from 1990 to 1998 in the respective equations
means that the positive eects of trade, which has grown over the period,
are not fully reected in the scenarios. The neglect of this favorable develop-
ment is however small. The neglect of the dummies in the growth projections
may also be seen to contribute to scenarios that are moderately optimistic.
37
Note that the eects of EU structural funds are not modeled explicitly in
the scenarios. To a certain but unquantiable extent they are contained in
36
Government consumption in the accession countries will also depend on pre-accession
aid and structural funds of the EU.
37
It is not implausible to expect that some very successful transition countries may
experience a sustained high growth phase, as Ireland is currently experiencing.
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the equations due to the fact that countries and periods are covered, where
substantial EU funds have been received.
The values for the variables GC and DI as used in the scenarios are pre-
sented in table 15 in the appendix for scenario 1 and in table 5 for the other
scenarios. Scenario 1 is based on the averages over the period 1990 to 1998
for GC and DI for each of the 10 countries. This scenario represents a lower
baseline case, as the variables GC and DI, averaged over 1990 to 1998, in-
clude both the early period of transition and the latter period of stabilization
and growth. Thus, this scenario corresponds to a continuation of the experi-
ence to date. It is important to note that due to the fact that the equations
are used with the convergence implying coeÆcients estimated for the EU
countries, using the values of all variables of the CEEC10 does not imply to
project an unstable or divergent evolution for these countries.
In all other scenarios identical values for the variables GC and DI are used
for all Central and Eastern European countries that are investigated. Sce-
nario 2 (GC = 0:1 and DI = 0:3) is as in Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1998b).
This scenario can be seen as a positive scenario, as it is characterized by a
high (private plus public) investment share and low government consump-
tion. This scenario requires the nancing of a large amount of investment.
Thus for the sustainability of this scenario the current account will be of
special importance. Only if the required external nancing is provided in the
form of FDI, and not in the form of short-term capital ows, this scenario can
provide a healthy development.
38
Scenario 2 corresponds closely to Scenario
5, where for GC and DI the average values over the period 1980 to 1995 are
taken for the South East Asian countries Indonesia, Japen, Malaysia, Philip-
pines and South Korea (GC = 0:108 and DI = 0:292). The period 1980 to
1995 covers the period of rapid growth of these economies, where growth has
been driven to a large extent by factor accumulation, both in physical and
in human capital.
Given the scenario related to the South East Asian experience, it is suggest-
ing itself to base growth scenarios also on European experiences, which may
be more closely related to the expected Eastern European developments. The
European scenarios are based on the historical experiences of the cohesion
countries. The following choices have been made: Scenario 3 is based on
the average values of the government consumption and investment shares for
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain over the period 1961 1998. Scenario
4 is based on the previously mentioned four countries plus Italy, with the
averages taken over the period 1961 1979. Finally, scenario 6 is based on
38
On current account sustainability issues in transition economies see e.g. Roubini and
Wachtel (1997).
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Scenario GC DI
1 Actual 1990 1998    
2 Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1998b) 0.100 0.300
3 GRC, IRL, PRT, ESP 1961 1998 0.134 0.249
4 GRC, IRL, ITA, PRT, ESP 1961 1979 0.119 0.268
5 South East Asia 1980 1995 0.108 0.292
6 IRL 1992 1998 0.146 0.173
Table 5: Values for the variables GC and DI for the growth projections for
equations (1) to (6). South East Asia contains Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia,
South Korea and the Philippines.
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Figure 9: Empirical distribution of projected real per capita GDP growth
rates for all scenarios and all equations for the Slovak Republic.
Ireland's recent period of extraordinary growth. Here the averages are com-
puted over the period 1992 1998. It is interesting to note that the recent
Irish growth experience is realized with a low investment share of only about
17% of GDP. This low investment share combined with the relatively large
share of government consumption implies low projected growth rates for the
CEEC10 for this scenario. For a further understanding of the Irish experience
it seems to be necessary to investigate investment in more detail. Ireland has
received extraordinary large amounts of foreign direct investment, which may
be an especially important source of growth in a catching-up economy.
With 8 equations and 6 scenarios in total 48 growth rate projections
for each of the CEEC10 are produced. In gure 9 these are displayed in
form of a histogram for the Slovak Republic. The multitude of growth rates
produced from dierent equations and assumptions concerning the evolution
25
BGR CZE EST HUN LTU LVA POL ROM SVK SVN
MIN 2.2 3.2 3.0 2.7 3.0 2.7 2.8 4.0 2.7 3.0
MAX 4.2 4.6 4.9 4.3 4.5 4.7 4.8 5.6 4.2 4.6
MEAN 3.3 4.0 4.0 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.8 5.0 3.6 3.9
Table 6: Minimum, maximum and mean real per capita GDP growth rate
projection for the CEEC10 for all 6 scenarios and all 8 equations.
of investment and government consumption is a simple and eective device to
assess the robustness of the projections. Considerable variation is observed,
with the minimum range of 1.5 percentage points for the Czech Republic and
the maximum range of 2 percentage points for Latvia and Poland. In table 6
the minimum, maximum and mean projected growth rates are displayed for
all CEEC10. The detailed results for all equations and all scenarios are given
in the appendix in tables 16 to 21.
The growth rate projections themselves are possibly not the most illu-
minating way for an assessment of the evolution of per capita GDP in the
CEEC10 relative to the EU. To quantify the implications concerning possible
catching-up of the CEEC10, the time periods it takes the individual CEEC10
members (and the whole group) to converge to relative levels of the Euro-
pean Union and to levels relative to the cohesion countries Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain (this latter group is referred to as C4 in the following)
are computed.
Of course, when computing levels relative to the European Union, it has to
be taken into account that the EU membership of (some of the) Central and
Eastern European countries changes the average real per capita GDP of the
enlarged European Union. A wide variety of possibilities arises, according to
which countries are assumed to join the EU. We present the two boundary
cases: One is to compute levels relative to a hypothetical European Union
consisting of 25 countries (the EU25), the other one is to compute levels
relative to the EU in its current boundaries. The latter possibility does not
take into account the mean decreasing eect of low-income countries joining
the European Union. The comparison with the cohesion countries' average
income is interesting, as these are the countries most comparable to the ap-
plicants in terms of per capita GDP. They are therefore the countries to
which income convergence, if it materializes, will be achieved rst.
Given the vast amount of 48 scenarios, a choice has to be made for purpose
of presentation. One possibility is to compute the implied convergence times
for all scenarios and present the range of possible outcomes. Another one is
to present results only for a few scenarios that may be of special interest, this
26
Scenario   +0:4% +1:2%
Mean 2.44 % 2.53 % 2.70 %
Optimistic 2.55 % 2.64 % 2.81 %
Table 7: Implied growth rates for the EU25 area.
is the approach followed here. We decide to use the following two scenarios:
The scenario based on the mean growth rates as presented in table 6 on the
one hand and a scenario with real per capita GDP growth rates implied by
choosing GC = 0:1 and DI = 0:3 (i.e. the values chosen by Fischer, Sa-
hay and Vegh, 1998b) and equation (6) on the other hand. The rst choice
presents, in statistical terms, our mean forecast and is chosen for that reason.
The second choice is labeled as the optimistic scenario, as for about half of
the countries it implies the maximum projected growth rate (see table 17 in
the appendix). The optimistic scenario is seen as a realizable outcome if a
favorable development continues.
When computing years to converge to relative levels with respect to the
EU15, the EU25 or the C4 an assumption concerning the growth rate of the
respective reference country group has to be made. For the EU15 a real
per capita GDP growth rate of 2% per year is assumed.
39
The same growth
rate is also applied to the cohesion countries, although it may be argued
that these are going to grow faster than the EU average also in the years
to come. Hence, the computed convergence times of the CEEC10 to the
C4 countries may be seen as upper bounds. For the hypothetical EU25 the
average per capita GDP growth rate depends on the assumed growth rates
for the CEEC10. The population weighted 25 country average per capita
growth rates are for both scenarios displayed in table 7. The weighted av-
erage per capita GDP gures are computed with 1998 population data. In
the projections population growth dierentials and induced changes in the
implied average per capita GDP gures are neglected. This however induces
only a very small and neglectable error.
For both the mean and the optimistic scenario, two additional scenarios are
computed. One where the growth rate is higher by 0.4 % and one where the
growth rate is higher by 1.2 %. These additional scenarios are intended to
illustrate possible additional benecial eects of integration to or member-
ship within the European Union. Remember that the equations and growth
projections do not include explicitly growth enhancing policy measures that
may be related to EU accession, like e.g. the eects of substantial structural
39
This corresponds closely to the observed average growth rate of about 1:9% over the
period 1990 to 1998.
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funds payments to the CEEC10. The precise quantitative eect of these and
other growth enhancing measures is hard to assess, but the two cases with an
additional 0.4% to an additional 1.2% per year seem to cover the plausible
range.
40
Note again that the additional growth in the CEEC10 also raises the
average growth rate in the EU25 area (see the respective columns in table 7).
The levels to which convergence of the CEEC10 is computed are 70 and 80%
of the European Union (both for the EU15 and EU25) and 70, 80 and 100%
for convergence to the average real per capita GDP levels prevalent in the
cohesion countries. The 70% with respect to the EU are chosen for the fol-
lowing reason: When Portugal and Spain joined the European Union in 1986,
their per capita GDP equaled approximately 70% of the EU12 average. The
share of per capita income Portugal and Spain had with respect to EU10 in
1986 is about 67%.
Let us start with the mean growth projections: The results are presented
in tables 8, 9 and 10.
41
It takes the countries on average 47 years to obtain
70% of the EU25 average real per capita GDP level. The variation between
the countries is enormous, ranging from -4 years for Slovenia to 123 years for
Bulgaria. Convergence is a short- or medium-run perspective only for Slove-
nia and the Czech Republic. For Hungary and the Slovak Republic already
more than 30 years are to be expected. Even for convergence towards 70%
or 100% of the level of the cohesion countries 33 and 53 years are projected
on average. For the accelerated versions of the mean scenario the average
number of years to achieve 70% of the EU25's average are reduced to 38
and 27 years respectively (see table 9). The eect of the acceleration on the
convergence times varies substantially between the countries, see table 10.
When the growth rate is increased by 1.2% as compared to the baseline the
time to converge (to any of the specied levels) is reduced by 26% for Roma-
nia and by 52% for Bulgaria. The average reduction is 40% and still 18% if
the growth rates are increased by 0.4 %. Thus, if the interpretation that the
accelerated scenarios represent the benecial eect of favorable policy within
the countries and with the aid from the European Union is accepted, then
these policies lead to a substantial reduction of the convergence time.
42
40
At least they cover the range reported in the literature and in public discussion.
41
The detailed results for convergence to specied levels of the EU25 and C4 for the
accelerated scenarios based on the mean scenario are reported in tables 22 and 23 in the
appendix. In the appendix in table 26 also the convergence times to levels relative to the
EU15 are given for the mean scenario and its accelerated versions.
42
It has to be stated again that the quantitative assumptions concerning the additional
eects are hypothetical. Therefore we suggest to interpret the result as follows: A rela-
tively modest growth stimulus of a 0.4% higher growth rate reduces the convergence time
substantially by about 20 % on average.
28
EU25
70%
EU25
80%
C4
70%
C4
80%
C4
100%
BGR 123 139 78 89 107
CZE 8 17 5 11 23
EST 49 58 36 43 54
HUN 38 50 25 34 48
LVA 74 83 55 62 74
LTU 73 83 53 60 73
POL 40 50 28 36 48
ROM 42 48 35 39 47
SVK 30 42 20 28 43
SVN -4 6 -5 2 14
Mean: 47 58 33 41 53
Table 8: Convergence time in years relative to levels of the EU25 and the C4
for the mean growth rates scenario.
EU25
70%
EU25
80%
C4
70%
C4
80%
C4
100%
Mean 47 58 33 41 53
+0:4% 38 46 27 33 43
+1:2% 27 33 20 24 32
Table 9: Average convergence time of the CEEC10 to levels relative to the
EU25 and the C4 for the mean growth rates scenario and its accelerated
versions.
BGR CZE EST HUN LVA LTU POL ROM SVK SVN Mean
0:4% -0.26 -0.17 -0.17 -0.21 -0.17 -0.18 -0.18 -0.11 -0.21 -0.17 -0.18
1:2% -0.52 -0.37 -0.37 -0.44 -0.39 -0.40 -0.40 -0.26 -0.44 -0.39 -0.40
Table 10: Percentage reduction of convergence time for the mean growth rate
scenarios when the growth rates are increased by 0:4% and 1:2%.
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EU25
70%
EU25
80%
C4
70%
C4
80%
C4
100%
BGR 64 73 46 52 63
CZE 6 13 3 8 18
EST 33 38 25 29 38
HUN 25 33 17 23 34
LVA 59 66 43 49 59
LTU 48 55 36 42 51
POL 33 41 23 29 40
ROM 40 45 31 36 43
SVK 13 30 14 20 31
SVN -3 4 -4 1 11
Mean: 33 40 23 29 39
Table 11: Convergence time in years relative to levels of the EU25 and the
C4 for the optimistic growth rates scenario.
For the optimistic scenario the results are presented in tables 11, 12 and
13. In the optimistic baseline case the average convergence time to achieve
70% of the EU25's average real per capita GDP is given by 33 years, compared
to 47 years for the baseline mean scenario. 70% of the cohesion countries'
income is obtained after 23 years, see table 11. The dierences between the
mean and the optimistic scenario are quite dramatic for some countries. For
Bulgaria the time to achieve the 70% mark is reduced from 123 to 64 years.
On the other hand for Slovenia the convergence time is reduced from -4 to -3
years. This is due to the eect that the higher growth rate in the CEEC10,
assumed in the optimistic scenario, leads to a faster growth of the 25 coun-
try average. This faster growth of all countries may lead to a deterioration
of the relative position of some advanced transition countries (measured in
convergence years).
As for the mean scenario also for the optimistic scenario accelerated versions
have been computed.
43
The reductions of convergence times, shown in ta-
ble 12, to levels relative to the EU25 and the C4 are smaller than for the
mean scenario, both in relative and in absolute terms. This is due to the
fact that the higher growth rates underlying the optimistic scenario (and the
accelerated versions of it) project smaller convergence times. The eect of
the higher growth rates outweighs the convergence time increasing eect of
the higher implied EU25 growth rate considerably, given the small GDP per
43
The detailed results are given in the appendix in tables 24 and 25. In the appendix also
the results for convergence times to levels relative to the EU15 are presented in table 27
for the optimistic scenario and its accelerated versions.
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EU25
70%
EU25
80%
C4
70%
C4
80%
C4
100%
Optim. 33 40 23 29 39
+0:4% 28 34 20 25 33
+1:2% 22 27 16 20 26
Table 12: Average convergence time of the CEEC10 to levels relative to the
EU25 and the C4 for the optimistic growth rates scenario and its accelerated
versions.
BGR CZE EST HUN LVA LTU POL ROM SVK SVN Mean
0:4% -0.16 -0.13 -0.12 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.16 -0.10 -0.16 -0.13 -0.14
1:2% -0.36 -0.31 -0.28 -0.34 -0.33 -0.31 -0.36 -0.25 -0.36 -0.31 -0.32
Table 13: Percentage reduction of convergence time for the optimistic growth
rate scenarios when the growth rates are increased by 0:4% and 1:2%.
capita times population weights of the CEEC10 in the computation of the
average over all 25 countries. Nevertheless, if growth is accelerated by 0.4%,
compared to the optimistic baseline case, the average reduction of conver-
gence time is still 14%. The strongest eects are now found for Bulgaria (as
before), Poland and the Slovak Republic, see table 13.
4 Conclusions
The results of the previous section convey one message clearly: With the
exception of Slovenia and the Czech Republic, the Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries applying for EU membership have a long way to go until
they achieve 70 or 80% of the enlarged EU's average real per capita GDP.
Across a wide variety of equations and scenarios the average time over all 10
countries is projected to be in the vicinity of 30 to 40 years. These results
once again reinforce the fact that many of the early estimates of an easy, fast
and maybe painless convergence towards Western European standards and
levels have been overly optimistic. After all, the results of 2 generations of
central planning can be expected to be long lasting. About a generation on
average.
Due to the still ongoing process of economic restructuring and reform, growth
projections cannot directly be based on growth accounting exercises in the re-
spective Eastern European countries. In this study the indirect way of basing
the growth projections on a mapping of the Western European growth and
convergence experience since 1960 is taken. The conclusions of this paper are
31
therefore only as valid as this approximation is a sensible approximation to
the expected growth performance in the CEEC10. A conditio sine qua non
is that the reform process in the CEEC countries is continued. Substantial
progress has been made in several areas, e.g. with respect to the liberaliza-
tion of prices (for the installment of a market price system in the rst place),
with respect to established foreign exchange markets or with respect to trade.
In other areas further eorts are required. Examples are privatization and
banking sector reform.
44
Assuming that the reform process is continuing, our approach of basing
growth projections on the assumed systemic convergence seems to be a rea-
sonable computational exercise. This indirect approach is of course by con-
struction susceptible to the critique of ad-hoc imposing structural relation-
ships observed in the current EU member states on the CEEC10s develop-
ment. However, the EU is the explicit destination of these countries' devel-
opment journey. Thus, if any indirect approach is feasible at all, it can only
be based on the EU's experience. Only if time proceeds further, a suÆcient
amount of data over a time period of non-excceptional circumstances will be-
come available. Then, when these countries are already on their neoclassical
growth path towards the EU, the need for such an exercise is presumably less
urgent. Given the deciency of available observations some crude approxi-
mations and choices have to be made, or to put it more direct: Non-standard
economic situations require non-standard economic analysis.
The individual countries vary greatly with respect to the projected conver-
gence times.
45
In our quantitative experiments the eects of integration with
or possible accession to the EU are signicantly positive. Substantial accel-
eration of the convergence times may be possible. It has to be noted that
the future evolution of income is primarily dependent on domestic policy
choices of the individual countries. The EU opens opportunities, but it is
in the discretion of the individual countries to take these { or to miss them.
Compare e.g. the development of Greece with the development of Ireland.
The Irish example also leads us to tentatively conclude that some especially
successful reform countries may achieve relative income levels of 70 or 80%
of the EU average faster than projected, maybe even faster than indicated
by the accelerated optimistic scenario.
The highly aggregative approach of this paper also represents a short-coming.
The process and the dynamics of economic reform depend strongly on the
44
The general focus of reform is shifting more towards micro-economic reforms, as in
most countries macro-economic reforms have been undertaken and macro-stabilization has
been achieved to a substantial degree.
45
It is aÆrmative of our approach that the country identied as the least successful
reformer, Bulgaria, is projected to have the longest convergence times.
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EU15 CEEC10 All 25 countries
year serCorr Vartn year serCorr Vartn year serCorr Vartn
1960 0.0157 0.0004 1989 0.0490 0.0010 1989 0.0362 0.0003
1975 -0.4657 0.0009 1993 -0.2549 0.0025 1993 -0.2549 0.0025
1989 -0.5054 0.0007 1995 -0.1549 0.0047 1995 -0.2900 0.0027
1998 -0.0806 0.0006 1998 -0.2118 0.0067 1998 -0.3672 0.0044
Table 14: Descriptive statistics for the Cross Prole Plots.
specic economic structure given in the individual countries. A more detailed
analysis with sectoral disaggregation is required to obtain further understand-
ing concerning the policy options in the CEEC10. Sectoral disaggregation
is especially interesting when studying transition economies, as a substantial
degree of sectoral reallocation is observed throughout the process of transi-
tion. A new private sector is emerging, the state sector is declining and the
agricultural sector is also over-sized in some countries. We see our contri-
bution not as a substitute for detailed investigations into the mechanics of
sectoral adjustment, but more as a complement that is intended to give a
bird-eye's view.
Further ongoing work is devoted to assess the extent and the implications of
a possibly observable Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson eect in the CEEC10, see
Wagner and Hlouskova (2001). Faster rising prices in faster growing coun-
tries may speed up (nominal) convergence towards the EU.
As a nal summarizing conclusion one may say that convergence of the
CEEC10 towards the EU average income level is a long-run perspective. This
perspective can be and is inuenced both by domestic policy choices in the
applicant countries and by the EU's policy approach towards enlargement
and towards the candidate countries.
5 Appendix
In tables 16 to 21 in the last column the mean values over all equations are
displayed for each of the countries for the scenario described in the respective
table.
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Figure 10: The correlation between the average growth rate of real per capita
GDP and log real per capita GDP in the initial year (1960), the average share
of investment of GDP and the average share of public consumption of GDP
for the EU14. Averages are computed over the period 1961 to 1998. The
regression line in the upper left picture shows the unconditional convergence
coeÆcient over this period:  = 2:046%.
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Figure 11: The sub-period correlations between the average growth rate of
real per capita GDP and the average share of investment of GDP for the
EU14 countries. The averages are computed over the sub-periods 1961 1969,
1970 1979, 1980 1989 and 1990 1998.
Period BGR CZE EST HUN LTU LVA POL ROM SVK SVN
GC 89 0.07 0.20 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.20 0.06 0.12 0.22 0.20
DI 89 0.33 0.27 0.33 0.27 0.36 0.34 0.39 0.27 0.32 0.18
GC 90-98 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.11 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.13 0.23 0.20
DI 90-98 0.16 0.30 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.26 0.31 0.21
Table 15: Values for the variables GC and DI for the CEEC10, for 1989 and
averages over the period 1990 to 1998.
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Figure 12: The sub-period correlations between the average growth rate of
real per capita GDP and the average share of government consumption of
GDP for the EU14 countries. The averages are computed over the sub-
periods 1961 1969, 1970 1979, 1980 1989 and 1990 1998.
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GDP (1) (1in) (2) (2in) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BGR 2.2 3.6 2.6 3.9 2.3 2.5 3.1 2.9 2.9
CZE 3.9 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.9 3.8 4.2 3.9
EST 3.6 4.0 3.8 4.2 3.5 3.7 4.0 4.4 3.9
HUN 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.3 3.4 3.8 3.7 3.6
LTU 3.4 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.4 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6
LVA 3.1 4.1 3.4 4.4 3.1 3.4 3.9 3.9 3.7
POL 2.8 4.5 3.2 4.8 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.4
ROM 4.7 5.2 5.0 5.4 4.6 5.0 5.1 4.9 4.9
SVK 3.5 3.2 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.5 3.3 3.8 3.4
SVN 3.1 3.6 3.2 3.4 3.0 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.3
Mean 3.4 3.9 3.6 4.1 3.3 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.7
Table 16: Growth scenarios for real per capita GDP with the structural
variables GC and DI as observed in the respective Central and Eastern
European country over the period 1990 to 1998. Scenario 1.
GDP (1) (1in) (2) (2in) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BGR 3.5 3.3 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.5 4.2 4.2 3.7
CZE 4.3 4.2 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.4
EST 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.0 4.2 4.7 4.9 4.4
HUN 3.8 3.7 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.8 4.3 4.3 4.0
LTU 4.1 4.0 4.5 4.3 4.0 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.3
LVA 3.9 3.8 4.3 4.2 3.8 4.0 4.7 4.6 4.2
POL 4.0 4.0 4.4 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.4 4.2 4.2
ROM 5.1 5.5 5.4 5.6 5.0 5.3 5.5 5.3 5.3
SVK 3.9 3.7 4.1 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.2 3.9
SVN 4.2 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.3
Mean 4.1 4.1 4.4 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.5 4.5 4.3
Table 17: Growth scenarios for real per capita GDP with the structural
variables GC and DI as in Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1998b) (GC = 0.1 and
DI = 0.3). Scenario 2.
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GDP (1) (1in) (2) (2in) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BGR 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 2.9 3.1 3.7 3.7 3.3
CZE 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.1 3.9
EST 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.1 3.5 3.8 4.2 4.4 3.9
HUN 3.3 3.3 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.8 3.8 3.5
LTU 3.6 3.6 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.8
LVA 3.3 3.4 3.8 3.8 3.4 3.6 4.2 4.1 3.7
POL 3.5 3.6 3.9 3.9 3.5 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.7
ROM 4.6 5.1 4.9 5.3 4.5 4.9 5.0 4.8 4.9
SVK 3.4 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.5
SVN 3.7 4.2 3.9 4.1 3.5 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.9
Mean 3.6 3.7 3.9 4.0 3.5 3.8 4.0 4.0 3.8
Table 18: Growth scenarios for real per capita GDP with the structural
variables GC and DI as in the fast growing EU countries (Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain) over the period 1961 1998 (GC = 0.134, DI = 0.249).
Scenario 3.
GDP (1) (1in) (2) (2in) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BGR 3.2 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.3 3.9 3.9 3.4
CZE 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.2 3.8 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.1
EST 3.8 4.0 4.1 4.3 3.7 3.9 4.4 4.6 4.1
HUN 3.5 3.4 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.6 4.0 4.0 3.7
LTU 3.8 3.8 4.2 4.1 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.0
LVA 3.5 3.6 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.8 4.4 4.3 3.9
POL 3.7 3.8 4.1 4.1 3.7 3.8 4.1 3.9 3.9
ROM 4.8 5.2 5.1 5.4 4.7 5.0 5.2 5.0 5.1
SVK 3.6 3.4 3.8 3.7 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.7
SVN 3.9 4.3 4.1 4.2 3.7 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.1
Mean 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.1 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.2 4.0
Table 19: Growth scenarios for real per capita GDP with the structural
variables GC and DI as in the fast growing EU countries (Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain) over the period 1961 1979 (GC = 0.119, DI =
0.268). Scenario 4.
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GDP (1) (1in) (2) (2in) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BGR 3.4 3.2 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.2 3.6
CZE 4.2 4.1 4.5 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.5 4.5 4.3
EST 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.4 3.9 4.1 4.6 4.8 4.3
HUN 3.8 3.6 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.7 4.2 4.2 3.9
LTU 4.0 3.9 4.4 4.2 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.3 4.2
LVA 3.8 3.7 4.2 4.1 3.8 4.0 4.6 4.5 4.1
POL 3.9 3.9 4.3 4.2 3.9 4.0 4.3 4.1 4.1
ROM 5.0 5.4 5.3 5.6 4.9 5.2 5.4 5.2 5.3
SVK 3.8 3.6 4.1 3.9 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.1 3.9
SVN 4.1 4.4 4.3 4.4 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.3
Mean 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.2
Table 20: Growth scenarios for real per capita GDP with the structural
variables GC and DI as in the fast growing South East Asian countries (In-
donesia, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea and the Philippines) over the period
1980 1995. (GC = 0.108, DI = 0.292). Scenario 5.
GDP (1) (1in) (2) (2in) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BGR 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.4 2.7 3.2 3.0 2.7
CZE 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.4
EST 3.0 3.5 3.4 3.8 3.0 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.4
HUN 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.2 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.1 3.0
LTU 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.2 3.3
LVA 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.4 2.9 3.2 3.7 3.4 3.2
POL 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.6 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.0 3.2
ROM 4.0 4.7 4.3 4.9 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.1 4.4
SVK 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.2 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.0 3.0
SVN 3.1 3.8 3.3 3.7 3.0 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
Mean 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.6 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.3 3.3
Table 21: Growth scenarios for real per capita GDP with the structural
variables GC and DI as in Ireland over the period 1992 1998 (GC = 0.146,
DI = 0.173). Scenario 6.
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EU25
70%
EU25
80%
C4
70%
C4
80%
C4
100%
BGR 90 102 60 68 82
CZE 7 14 4 10 19
EST 41 48 30 36 46
HUN 30 39 20 27 39
LVA 61 69 45 51 61
LTU 59 67 43 49 60
POL 33 41 23 29 40
ROM 38 43 31 35 42
SVK 24 33 16 23 34
SVN -3 5 -4 2 12
Mean: 38 46 27 33 43
Table 22: Convergence time in years to levels relative to the EU25 and the
C4 for the mean growth rates scenario accelerated by 0:4%.
EU25
70%
EU25
80%
C4
70%
C4
80%
C4
100%
BGR 59 67 41 47 56
CZE 5 11 3 7 14
EST 31 36 23 27 34
HUN 21 28 15 19 28
LVA 45 51 34 38 46
LTU 43 49 32 36 44
POL 24 30 17 22 29
ROM 31 35 25 28 34
SVK 17 24 11 16 24
SVN -2 3 -3 1 9
Mean: 27 33 20 24 32
Table 23: Convergence time in years to levels relative to the EU25 and the
C4 for the mean growth rates scenario accelerated by 1:2%.
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EU25
70%
EU25
80%
C4
70%
C4
80%
C4
100%
BGR 54 61 39 44 54
CZE 5 11 3 7 15
EST 29 34 22 26 33
HUN 22 28 15 20 29
LVA 50 57 37 42 50
LTU 42 48 31 36 44
POL 28 35 19 24 34
ROM 36 40 28 32 38
SVK 18 25 12 17 26
SVN -2 4 -3 1 9
Mean: 28 34 20 25 33
Table 24: Convergence time in years to levels relative to the EU25 and the
C4 for the optimistic growth rates scenario accelerated by 0:4%.
EU25
70%
EU25
80%
C4
70%
C4
80%
C4
100%
BGR 41 47 30 34 41
CZE 4 9 2 6 12
EST 23 28 18 21 27
HUN 17 22 11 15 22
LVA 39 44 29 33 39
LTU 33 38 25 29 35
POL 21 27 15 19 26
ROM 30 33 23 26 32
SVK 14 19 9 13 20
SVN -2 3 -3 1 7
Mean: 22 27 16 20 26
Table 25: Convergence time in years to levels relative to the EU25 and the
C4 for the optimistic growth rates scenario accelerated by 1:2%.
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Mean +0:4% +1:2%
70% 80% 70% 80% 70% 80%
BGR 94 104 72 80 49 55
CZE 15 21 12 18 9 13
EST 46 53 39 44 29 33
HUN 38 46 30 37 22 27
LVA 65 72 54 60 40 45
LTU 64 71 52 59 38 43
POL 39 47 32 38 24 28
ROM 42 46 37 41 30 33
SVK 32 41 26 33 18 23
SVN 6 13 5 11 3 8
Mean: 44 52 36 42 26 31
Table 26: Convergence time in years to income levels relative to the EU15
with mean growth rate scenario and the accelerated scenarios with additional
growth rates of 0:4% and 1:2%:
Optim. +0:4% +1:2%
70% 80% 70% 80% 70% 80%
BGR 56 62 48 53 37 41
CZE 12 17 10 15 8 12
EST 32 37 28 33 23 26
HUN 27 33 23 28 18 22
LVA 52 58 45 50 35 39
LTU 45 50 39 43 31 34
POL 33 39 28 33 21 25
ROM 38 42 34 38 28 31
SVK 24 30 20 26 16 20
SVN 5 10 4 9 3 7
Mean: 32 38 28 33 22 26
Table 27: Convergence time in years to income levels relative to the EU15
with optimistic growth rate scenario and the accelerated scenarios with ad-
ditional growth rates of 0:4% and 1:2%.
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